A society of Sperm Fathers is a society of 14-year-old girls with babies and 14-year-old boys with guns.
3 Together, these three quotations suggest a critical hypothesis as to the effect of family structure on the behavior of boys and girls. The first quotation is a contemporary verse for children and frequently is applied to a large number of animal species. To the extent that it captures an essential truth about the animal kingdom, it is that family structures are largely composed of a mother and her children, while the biological father is nowhere to be seen. While there are surely exceptions to this rule, that characterization is a common one. Hobbes, 1962, p. 100. 3 Blankenhorn, Basic Books, 1995, p. 184. The second quotation is of course from one of the great philosophical tracts of the English language, and provides a characterization of the state of nature. An important part of that state is the absence of fathers from their children, with mothers having the sole responsibility for rearing the young.
And finally, the third quotation is from a current book that details the consequences for American society of the large and increasing absence of many children from their fathers. To Blankenhorn, the Sperm Father is the ultimate state of absent fatherhood with only the biological factor remaining. The Sperm Father resembles the biological parent of the animal kingdom.
These quotations suggest that family structure, in particular the absence of fathers from the home, may have a substantial impact on the behavior of children. Our attention here is directed at criminal behavior, which is largely a male phenomenon. As Blankenhorn implies, female delinquency takes a different form and is not the subject of this paper.
There is another factor that is also emphasized as the primary explanation for delinquent behavior, which is poverty or low income levels. See the following statement from a recent discussion of teenage violence: "Growing up in an environment of harsh poverty with a feeling that opportunities for success are closed because of discrimination can lead to helplessness and rage that find expressing in violence. " Hechinger, 1994, p. 4. levels were raised, and income distributed more evenly, this conduct would dissipate. Because there are two rival themes that are commonly used to explain delinquency, we explore the joint impact of income and family structure.
A Conceptual Framework
Although economic agents are typically presumed to consider only their own utility, that presumption has never applied to actions related to family members.
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In that setting, altruistic concerns are commonly assumed in which the actions of some family members affect the utility levels of others. One result, Becker writes, is that a member's "concern about the welfare of other [family] members provide each...with some insurance against disasters." In regard to parents and children, however, Becker suggests a pattern of asymmetric concerns in which the parent's utility function includes the children's consumption as well as his or her own, while the child's utility function depends only on its own consumption.
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This structure leads to "the rotten-kid theorem," which offers some interesting results. One is that if the parent is 5 See Bergstrom's discussion of Adam Smith's views on these issues (1996, pp. 1904-5) . 6 Becker, 1974, p. 1076. 7 Becker, 1981, p. 114. sufficiently benevolent towards his or her child, not only is the child better off but so is the parent. As a result, altruism benefits not only the recipient but also the provider. To be sure, this conclusion follows only if the parent is sufficiently benevolent to the child. An important implication of the theorem is that both parent and child are better off when the parent is highly altruistic towards the child, but both parties are worse off when altruism is lower or absent.
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While this analysis is framed in terms of consumption levels and monetary transfers, it has broader implications than that. Individual and family objectives involve a larger set of concerns that reflect the entire gamut of activities pursued by family members. When a child agrees to sacrifice his private goals for those of his family, he does so in return for the broader scope of benevolence that follows from his parents' concern. When a child accepts the restrictions placed on his conduct by his parents, he does so with the understanding that ultimately he is better off.
And the parents are willing to make the required effort because they too are better off.
See also Bergstrom, 1989. Furthermore, the analysis is equally cogent when families disintegrate. Becker writes that "altruism can benefit altruists only when there is substantial interaction between them and the beneficiaries."
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When interactions between parent and child diminish, as a result, say, of divorce and the father's absence from the home, an anticipated result is that the parent's benevolence for the child declines from what it would be otherwise. If the decline is sufficient, the child will accept its implications and move to a more selfish outcome; and both parent and child are worse off. A direct implication of the rotten-kid theorem is that increased altruism encourages good behavior even on the part of a selfishly motivated child, while reduced or absent altruism encourages poor behavior. The child's conduct turns on the anticipated benevolence of the parent.
When a family dissolves, a direct effect is lost proximity between the non-custodial parent and the child.
As a result, "the psychic returns from children" for that parent are greatly reduced; and even if they are not, both the time and monetary costs of maintaining close contact are 9 Becker, 1977, p. 507 . See also Becker, Landes and Michael, 1972, pp. 1152-3. substantially increased.
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In either case, there is reduced concern by the absent parent for the child.
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Some Hypotheses on Parental Behavior An essential feature of parental behavior is the desire to influence the choices or actions of their children.
Parents believe that the child alone will not make the "right" decisions, so they must step in for the "child's own good." At its essence, parents believe that while the child may maximize current utility, he or she will often not understand the eventual implications for many of the choices which are made, and parental intervention is therefore
needed. An important element of parental control is that it leads to lower child utility when these actions are taken.
Consider an action d that a child can take and which offers him positive utility. However, the parent believes that the action will eventually have a negative impact on the child so that it imposes negative utility for the parent. The parent is concerned about the child's prospective choice, and will endure lower utility if the child takes the complained-about action. In this 10 See Weiss and Willis, 1985, pp. 268-292 . In a second paper, these authors find that because of agency problems, "it costs the husband $5 to raise expenditures on his child by $1." Reduced benevolence by an absent father follows directly. Weiss and Willis, 1993, p. 665. 11 A father's absence from the home typically leads him to have little contact with his child. Fully 58 percent of absent fathers saw their child fewer than several times a year, while only about onequarter had contact more than once a week. Furthermore, parent-child contact diminished over time. While 28 percent of absent fathers, separated for two years or less, saw their child fewer than several times a year, that percentage increased to 42 percent between three and five year post-separation, to 62 percent for six to ten years following the father's separation, and to fully 72 percent at eleven years or more. Seltzer, 1991, Tables 1 and 4, pp. 86, 91. formulation, d enters the child's utility function with a positive effect but the parent's utility function with a negative effect. Therefore, we can write
Note that here the parent is altruistic towards the child in that the child's consumption level enters positively in the parent's utility function; so that C p and C k are the consumption levels of the parent and child respectively. On the other hand, the parent's consumption level does not enter into the child's utility function.
If the parent is present and assumes his or her parental responsibilities, he or she can impose a cost on the child since the child's consumption level is set by the parents. In that case, they can reduce the child's consumption level whenever certain actions cross a predetermined threshold; whenever d > d* where the threshold d* is also set by the parent. In these circumstances, the child's consumption level C k is reduced by an amount x to (C k -x). The value of x is determined by the parent and can be increased until it is no longer beneficial for the child to carry out the particular action. In other words, x can be increased until:
In effect, the child is penalized by reducing his or her consumption level until it is no longer utility enhancing to engage in the prohibited activity. When the prior condition is met, the child sets d < d*; and the parent is also pleased because:
To be sure, this process requires the active participation of the parent. Consider two alternative descriptions of parental behavior. First, let the parent be absent and have little concern for the child. In that case, the latter two arguments of the parental utility function from expression (1) are removed, and the child is free to maximize his or her own utility function free of parental control.
A second alternative is suggested by the visiting parent syndrome which arises when the parent sees the child infrequently and is thereby unwilling to bear the child's displeasure at facing reduced utility levels. and beneficiary, we let family structure be a proxy for a parent's altruistic conduct toward his or her child.
Although family structure may reflect other matters as well, we assume that the critical factor for altruistic behavior towards a child is continued contact.
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To be sure, other factors may be important as well.
Among these additional factors is the level of family income. To the extent that family incomes are higher, boys
An alternate argument is that the critical factor is a boy's opportunity to copy or imitate his father which requires continued contact between the two; and that this is lost when the father is absent. This hypothesis suggests, however, that a substitute father would do nearly as well in limiting delinquent behavior, which is tested in the empirical analysis below. may see less need for criminal activity to achieve their goals. The suggestion here is not that boys in higher income families are more likely to promote joint family objectives but rather that they will have less need to engage in criminal activity to attain their individual goals. As a result, higher family incomes should be associated with lower rates of criminal activity.
Finally, there is the question of age and the prospect that older boys will have more opportunity to run afoul of the criminal justice system. We anticipate that age will also have a positive impact on delinquency. In the analysis that follows, we test these propositions for a sample of nearly five thousand boys between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two.
Data
The data used in this study is the National For comparison, we also investigate the importance of the mother present in the home when the male respondent was age fourteen. However, there was far less variability on this account. Mothers were present in 92.3 percent of the cases. To investigate this factor, we therefore consider only two categories: (a) mother present in the household;
and (b) mother absent.
In terms of ethnicity, the sample is composed of 15.6 percent Hispanics, 25.2 percent Blacks, and 59.2 percent non-Hispanic, non-Black youths. From an entire sample of 6,403 boys, data on income was available for 4,937 of them.
Average family income was $17,402 and ranged from nothing to $75,001. The logarithm of family income was approximately normally distributed in the range from -2 to +2 deviations around the mean; however there was more weight in the tails, especially for very low incomes.
As reported in Table I , there were 4,869 boys about whom information was available on the three delinquency measures, family income and family structure. Note that the fractions of male youths reporting ever being stopped are comparable for the three ethnic groups.
However, a smaller fraction of Black youths report ever being charged and ever being convicted. Black youths also report lower conditional likelihoods for ever being charged given that they have been stopped and for ever being convicted given their being charged.
These last results raise concerns about the NLSY sample of Black youth since they have a much higher chance of being in prison by age 25 than others. According to more recent Department of Justice figures, the probability of this happening to a Black male is 15.9 percent, to an Hispanic male is 6.3 percent, and to a White male is 1.7 percent. Because of these sampling disparities, we expect to find higher reported rates of delinquency among the non-Hispanic, non-Black sample.
Do Fathers Make A Difference?
In Table II , we report the logit parameters which estimate the impact of family structure on the three measures of delinquent behavior, controlling for family income, age, and ethnicity. We interpret the relevant values as reflecting the probabilities of ever being stopped, ever being charged, and ever being convicted, and hypothesize that the impact of family structure is greater for the more serious measures of delinquency.
Ever Stopped
As can be seen, the only significant variable in the first equation reported in Table II is the father's presence in the household when the boy was age fourteen. This presence reduced the likelihood that the youth would be stopped by police. Apparently, a boy is more likely to be charged with a crime if there is some other man present in the house as compared with no man present, 2 although of course the father's presence has the largest salutary effect.
The coefficients reflecting the effects of age and family income have the expected signs. Older boys have an increased chance of being charged with a crime, and family income makes one less likely to be charged. The importance of these factors is described in Figure 1 , which represents all three ethnic groups. It presents the estimated probabilities of being charged with a crime at the average 2 This finding conflicts with the copying or imitation hypothesis suggested earlier. Another conclusion from these results follows from the total effect of a father's absence, including its impact on family income. In the subsample of 3826 boys used in Table   IV This value rests on the estimated coefficients from the second column in Table II , and has a standard deviation of $15,072.
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We use this equation because the family structure variable there is limited to father present or absent.
conventional levels. Only if we were willing to reject hypotheses at a two-tail significance level of 0.18 would this variable be statistically significant. Again the most important factor is the father's presence in the household when the boy was fourteen, and again age and family income have the expected signs.
Ethnicity
Although the Hispanic ethnic variable has a negative sign in all three equations, it is never statistically significant. That is not so for the variable indicating
Black youths, where the coefficient is highly significant for both of the latter measures of delinquency. However, as reported in Table I , both minority ethnic groups were apparently sampled differently from the larger non-Hispanic, non-Black population. The two minority groups have much lower proportions of older boys in the sample as compared with the majority group, so in effect, the coefficients reflecting ethnicity are confounded by the factor of age. observations. Consequently, this group was labeled nonBlacks and estimated separately from the Black ethnic group.
The empirical results are reported in Table III . As reported there, we estimate a constrained equation where the effects of family income and family structure are presumed to be equal as well as an unconstrained equation. In these equations, family structure is represented by only two categories, indicating the presence or absence of the father from the home.
Note that constraining the coefficients for family income and family structure to be the same for Blacks and non-Blacks did not significantly reduce the likelihood function for this sample of 4,869 observations. However, the effect of the age variable on the probability of ever being charged is clearly larger for Blacks than for nonBlacks. This difference is illustrated in Figure 2 which rests on the estimated logit equation evaluated at the means for family income and family structure for each ethnic group. As indicated, the probabilities of ever being charged with criminal activity increase more rapidly for
Blacks than for non-Blacks as the boy's age increases. In an earlier version, we also included the parents' education levels, by the highest grade in school completed by father and mother. However, neither variable was statistically significant in the reduced form equation for Father Present. While this approach uses various instruments to remove the endogeneity of a father's presence or absence from the home, our second method uses only one. What is required is a variable that affects the father's presence but does not directly influence the child's delinquency. To this end, we distinguish between fathers whose absence is due to their premature death and those who remain alive though absent.
Unfortunately, this instrument is only partially satisfactory because some fathers may have died because of their involvement in criminal activity. A better instrument would have been those fathers whose deaths were unrelated to any criminal activity, but unfortunately that degree of detail is missing from our data set. However, to the extent that most of the fathers absent because of death died from illness or other extraneous causes, this variable permits a clear test of the endogeneity factor.
The relevant data are presented in Table V , where the first figure in each cell is the probability of a boy being charged with a crime, and so is comparable to the variable used above. Before proceeding, note the apparent anomaly that there are 106 cases in which the father is present when the boy was fourteen but dead in 1980. These cases arise because the father's presence or absence refers not to a specific year but rather to a point in the boy's life. For boys age 22 in 1980, their father may have been present eight years earlier but had died in the intervening years.
It is evident from this table that the probability of a boy being charged with a crime where his father was absent at an early age, does not differ between those whose father was dead or alive when the sample was taken. In either case, these probabilities are substantially greater than Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of the estimated values, which are determined under the assumption of independence. The number of cases in each cell is the third figure given.
where the father is alive and present. If we assume that their fathers' deaths were unrelated to any criminal activity, then these results provide a further test of the endogeneity factor. They indicate that the father's absence is the critical determinant of delinquent behavior and not some other unspecified factor.
There is also corroborating evidence from those cases where the father was present at age fourteen but dead in 1980. The reported probability here is essentially the same as that found where the father was absent, for whatever reason, at age fourteen. At the same time, the probability of delinquent behavior is significantly lower when the father was present at age fourteen and remained so through 1980. Only a father's continued presence had the desired effect of reducing the prospects of delinquency.
Another approach to Table V is to assume alternatively that those fathers who had died by 1980 were either bad parents or had imparted bad genes to their offspring. In that context, we should look only to cases where this parent is alive to determine the impact of his absence. Doing so, we find that a father's absence sharply increases the probability that his son will be charged with a crime by age 22.
While these tests separately do not offer conclusive evidence of the importance of the endogeneity factor, together they suggest there is something more at work.
These findings together support the critical importance of the father's presence or absence from the home as a leading determinant of his son's subsequent delinquent behavior.
Do Mothers Make A Difference?
We also estimated logit equations for the three measures of delinquency but where family structure is represented by the presence or absence of the boy's mother.
The results are reported in Table VI . Before reviewing these results, recall that there is far less variability in this factor than with the presence or absence of the boy's father; and that for all ethnic groups, over 90 percent of the boys in the sample lived with their mothers at age fourteen.
As can be seen, none of the variables included in the first equation, representing the probability of ever being stopped for criminal activity, are statistically significant. This finding contrasts with the results reported in Table II where the father's presence was statistically significant.
Turning to the second measure of delinquency, both age and family income are significant here, as was reported in the earlier equation. Similarly, the coefficient representing the Black ethnic group is negative and statistically significant. The only difference here is that the mother's presence is not significant, which stands in sharp contrast to the significant effect of the father's The most interesting comparisons presented in Table VII are those for family structures in which one parent is absent from the home or with a step-parent. Note the striking differences between the "Mother-Stepfather" and "Father-Stepmother" categories: for the latter two measures of delinquency, the reported probabilities are twice as high in the "Mother-Stepfather" case as in the "Father-
Stepmother" case; and there is even a difference of nearly ten percentage points for the first measure. These findings are thus consistent with the earlier empirical results that stress the impact of a father's presence at home on his son's conduct. To be sure, the first case has a lower Although our hypotheses rest on differences in altruistic behavior between parents and stepparents, there are also differences in abusive behavior which could account for our findings. After reviewing the evidence on this issue, Daly and Wilson find that "Stepparenthood per se remains the single most powerful risk factor for child abuse that has yet been identified" (1989, pp. 87-88) . Unfortunately these writers do not distinguish between stepmothers and stepfathers. 
Conclusions
These empirical results are striking. Overall, the most critical factor affecting the prospect that a male youth will encounter the criminal justice system is the presence of his father in the home. All other, even including family income, are much less important.
10
While Wilson and Herrnstein review the evidence that delinquency is related to broken homes, they find it to be mixed (1985, p. 245) . Their conclusion may be due to the various measures used to indicate delinquency. See also Loury, 1987. There are significant policy implications that follow from these results. Currently, most discussions of teenage violence look first at family income. An example is the Progressive Policy Institute report on "Putting Children
First."
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Its primary proposals deal with tax credits and exemptions for children, and for collecting greater child support payments from absent fathers. Whatever the usefulness of these proposals to achieve other objectives, our findings suggest that they will have little effect on the problem of teenage delinquency. Both measures tacitly accept the father's absence from the home and seek to ameliorate its consequences by increasing the income available to mother and child. However, as reported above, the trade-off here is too steep; it requires an increased family income of approximately $50,000 to counter the father's absence, and none of these proposals can hope to achieve that measure of income replacement. The empirical results reported above indicate that policy measures directed at income replacement cannot succeed.
Furthermore, efforts to find "replacement" fathers for teenage boys may be equally unsuccessful. While we have no results on the impact of male role models outside the home, we find that replacement men within the home offer little hope for improvement in teenage delinquency, and may even make matters worse. Recall our finding with regard to the 11 Kamarck and Galston, 1990. measure, Ever Charged, that the absence of a man from the home was a more salutary factor than the presence of another man who is not the boy's father. While there may be examples where replacement fathers have desirable effects, we cannot anticipate that policy actions taken in this area will have much effect.
Fathers play a critical role in the rearing of boys and young men. As one psychologist concludes, "rejecting a son turns out to be the most demoralizing thing a father can do to his son."
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While this rejection can surely take place within the home as outside, these findings suggest that rejection is more common or has a larger impact when the father is absent from the home. Policy measures should be directed first at improving the prospect that boys will grow up in homes with their fathers as well as their mothers.
One approach would be to change the divorce laws such that they treat divorce petitions between parents differently than those between couples without children.
Where children are involved, divorces should be more difficult to obtain. To be sure, any change in this direction will have little impact on the large and growing proportion of births that occur outside of marriage. In the past, these births were limited by an overwhelming social disapproval, which unfortunately has dissipated in recent years. How to replace that disapproval with something else 12 Heath, 1991, p. 282. such that boys grow up in the same households as their fathers is a difficult task for which we have no suggestions. Still, it is an effort that deserves society's attention.
Becker's model of altruistic behavior within the family has important implications for public policy. It concludes that both parent and child benefit from altruistic actions taken by the parent on behalf of the child. The goal of public policy should be to promote and encourage this conduct, which can be done best by finding ways to support close and continued relationships between fathers and sons.
